

file GAO

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

CIA Identification with published GAO Reports

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

7B02 HQS

OLL/LD

DATE

9 Feb 84

STAT
SIAI

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. Dick Kerr, ADDI

Dick:

2.

What do you think about identifying the CIA as a source of information in GAO reports (both classified and unclassified)?

3.

4.

We have two requests. GAO wants us to approve their listing CIA as a contributor, even before they are willing to let us see the entire report.

5.

6.

STAT

The only existing guidelines (see attached) do not require us to be identified as a resource. I would vote against allowing such a citation, but perhaps this is an overly cautious approach.

8.

We propose sending the attached letter to GAO under [redacted] signature, but I STAT want to see if the DI would support our position.

9.

10.

11.

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12.

10Feb84

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13.

This is an issue that OLL has to decide. It makes little difference to the DI whether we are mentioned in the finished report but my impression is that it makes a good deal of difference to OLL & OGC. Your decision. Talk to Clair.

14.

15.

Dick
Dick Kerr

FORM
1-79

610

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

Page Denied

OLC 79-2701/2
28 December 1979

①

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: GAO Guidelines on Request for Intelligence Information

- REFERENCES:
- A. Memorandum for DDCI, from Acting Legislative Counsel, dated 16 February 1978, Subject: Dealings with the General Accounting Office (OLC 78-0585)
 - B. Memorandum for DDCI, from Acting Legislative Counsel, dated 27 April 1978, Subject: GAO/Intelligence Community Relationships (BYE 78-113091)
 - C. Memorandum for the Record, from Deputy Legislative Counsel, dated 13 December 1979, Subject: GAO Relationship (OLC 79-3502)

1. For the past several months, informal discussions with representatives of the GAO have taken place on the terms of reference to use in issuing internal GAO guidelines governing requests for intelligence information. This memorandum reports the outcome of these discussions.

2. Formal comments on the guidelines were neither solicited nor provided. Rather, the discussion process provided an opportunity to eliminate areas of contention and concentrate on areas of mutual interest such as improving the quality of GAO's work product and the need to minimize the drain on our resources and assure adherence to our security requirements.

3. A copy of the proposed GAO guidelines is attached. It is important to recognize what the guidelines do and do not do.

a. The guidelines do not:

(1) Grant GAO greater authority for access than presently exists.

(2) Constitute an agreement or contract between the DCI, the CIA or any other element of the Intelligence Community and GAO.

(3) Provide the specific wording on the do's and don't's in every case (a shortfall from our viewpoint but an institutional

INTERNAL USE ONLY

necessity for GAO--the inferred do's and don't's can only be validated through GAO's administration of the guidelines).

b. The guidelines do:

(1) Recognize the statutory and Executive Order responsibility and authority to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

(2) Limit access concerning intelligence activities (as opposed to finished intelligence) to those instances where either GAO's statutory right of access exists or where a chairman of a Congressional committee has jurisdiction over the matter.

(3) As relates to intelligence product:

(a) Eliminates GAO as a conduit to Congressional committees;

(b) Eliminates GAO as a determinator of the quality of the product;

(c) Views access as primarily an aid to assessing the quality of GAO's work product;

(d) Treats information primarily for background purposes with any use in a report to be on a nonattributable basis and in accordance with our security criteria;

(e) Requires a prior agreement if information is to be included or referenced in a GAO report, which in turn provides an opportunity to evaluate security, policy sensitivity and other relevant factors before granting access; and

(f) Recognizes that our resources are finite and limits our need to comment on GAO reports to those instances where the reports contain information, agreed beforehand, to be included or referenced in the report.

(4) The terms of references for the guidelines have been discussed against the background that:


(a) The Intelligence Community has won an exemption from the Comptroller General's enhanced statutory authority proposed under H.R. 24 and S. 1878;

any expansion of GAO's authority with respect to the Intelligence Community is to be resolved in charter legislation which in the context of S. 2525, Section 124, places GAO under the tight leash of the Congressional intelligence committees; and

(c) GAO has an important role in our Government which can be satisfied without diminution or risk to our special authorities and responsibilities.

The condition to be attached to GAO's access to information of an intelligence nature should be ironed out before access is granted and in a manner consistent with the spirit of the do's and don't's cited in paragraph 3. It is in the mutual interest of GAO and the intelligence agencies that this consistency prevail.

STAT


Deputy Legislative Counsel

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:

1 - DDCI	
1 - ER	
1 - Ex.Sec.	
1 - D/NFAC	
1 - DD/S&T	
1 - DD/O	
1 - OGC	
1 - Audit Staff/OIG	
1 - D/Fin/DD/A	1 - OLC Subject
1 - D/Sec/DD/A	1 - OLC Chrono

OLC:  (27 Dec 1979)

STAT

84-0042

To: [redacted], Chief Liaison Office CIA

Date January STAT 1984

From: Joe Kelley, USGAO/NSIAD

Subject: Reference to CIA in Proposed GAO Draft - Jordan Security Assistance

Based on the agreement between GAO and CIA and some discussions we had with [redacted] STAT
and [redacted] last fall concerning the above subject, I would appreciate it if you have STAT
someone look over the attached material. We plan to specifically cite the agency on page
10 in the Objective Scope, and Methodology section of the proposed draft. There will be
no other reference to the agency in the report. Once the proposed draft is approved with-
in our office we will formally transmit it to your office for any official comments your
agency desires to make.

U.S. G.P.O. 1979-628-698

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This report is one of a series on security assistance and arms sales to and security commitments with key Middle East countries.¹ The review of Jordan's security assistance programs was initiated in the spring of 1983 when King Hussein appeared likely to take an overt role in the Middle East peace process. In April 1983, the King announced he could not assume the role requested of him. Nevertheless, we proceeded with our review because of the continuing high level of congressional and public interest in Jordan.

The objectives of our review were to assess the overall U.S. security assistance program to Jordan and to determine whether U.S. objectives are being achieved. We placed particular emphasis on the

- role of U.S. security assistance in supporting Jordan's defense requirements,
- types and amounts of U.S. equipment and training supplied to Jordan,
- capacity of Jordan to effectively utilize U.S.-provided military equipment, and
- types and amounts of assistance supplied by other countries and Jordan military assistance to other Middle East countries.

After we began work, we determined that Jordan was in arrears on payments for U.S. foreign military sales. The status of Jordan's payment problems and the Departments of Defense and State efforts to resolve them were included in our review efforts.

We conducted our review at the Departments of Defense and State, Washington, D.C., including State's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and Defense's Office of International Security Assistance and Security Assistance Agency; the U.S. Embassy, Amman, Jordan; and the U.S. European Command, which until fiscal year 1984, had security assistance program responsibility for

Jordan.² We were also briefed by Defense and Central Intelligence Agencies' officials on their assessments of Jordan's military capabilities and the internal and external threats to Jordan's security. Such assessments were accepted by us without independent verification.

We also reviewed program documentation, congressional hearings and reports, and various reports and studies prepared by outside interest groups concerning Jordan. Our review was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

² Jordan security assistance program responsibility was assigned to the Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, beginning with fiscal year 1984.

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To: [redacted] Chief, Liaison Division, CIA

Date 1/23/83 STAT

From: Joe Kelley, USGAO/NSIAD for *Carol Schuster*

Subject:

Attached for your advance review are the Digest and selected pages from a proposed draft GAO report which will be sent to CIA and other agencies for official comment in February. CIA information is used in the report but page 8 is the only direct reference to CIA. Soviet bloc data included in the statistical chart is primarily from CIA reports. The data on military training is a composite of data provided by CIA and DIA. [redacted] in your Office of Statistical Issues was our primary CIA contact on this assignment.

P.S. This is the case that [redacted] and I discussed this week.

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Next 11 Page(s) In Document Denied